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Abstract: 
 
The aim of this article is to describe, explain and understand the problems of effective state 
ownership administration in modern Russia. The author discusses the need of qualitative 
institutional transformations in the system of state ownership management due to modern 
conditions of innovative processes in the economic system. The main direction of the state 
policy concerning the implementation of state ownership administration (including the 
current process of privatization) is qualitative improvement of public administration. The 
overview of Russian experience in active introduction of results-based management into the 
authorities’ activities has revealed a negative concern in the existing management system: 
introduced productivity indicators are generally used as the instrument of control or 
reporting instead of management. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an effective 
monitoring and evaluation system of state ownership administration that can promote 
remedial action for the weak elements of the civil service management system.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Strategic objectives of Russian modernization, including innovation development, 
need changes. Property relations have impact on the quality of the institutional 
environment that forms the innovative growth potential. 
 
By innovative development the author means economy based on knowledge, 
innovations and continuous technological improvement. It involves production and 
export of hi-tech goods with high additional cost, including export of technologies. 
Innovative economy is capable to use any innovations effectively and implies the 
corresponding innovative infrastructure: legislative base, material components of the 
innovative system and institutional  transformations of state ownership. More than 
that, it includes six basic elements: (1) education; (2) science; (3) human capital and 
high quality of life; (4) innovative system; (5) innovative industry; (6) effective 
public administration (favorable environment of innovative system functioning). 
 
Institutional  transformation of state ownership is one of the growth factors. This is 
the subject of scientific research in such fields as institutional economics (Coase, 
1960; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Pejovich, 1990), public choice theory (Buchanan, 
1978), and the theory of “collective action” (Olson, 1982). Scientists unanimously 
indicate the need for the increase of effectiveness in state ownership management 
(Clague, Keefer, Knack, & Olson, 1997; Cox, 2008; Pargendler, 2012; Marra & 
Carlei, 2014). The problems of effective use of state ownership are of interest from 
the practical point of view.  
 
The quantitative structure of the Russian state property fund has been changed in 
connection with the long-term period of state ownership privatization and approaches 
to it. The authorities consider modern privatization, firstly, as the instrument of 
investment attraction in public sector; secondly, as the instrument of competition 
development; and thirdly, as the instrument of state ownership involvement into the 
macroeconomic system. New algorithms of privatization are reflected in “The concept 
of federal property management until 2018” (Federal Agency for State Property 
Management [Rosimushchestvo], 2015)
.
  
 
The system of socio-economic goals in state ownership administration involves a 
number of requirements to form an effective property structure – it has to include 
preferences of all main consumers: population, corporate sector, authorities, and 
investors. However, the necessity to improve the system of state ownership 
management is defined by the low level of consumers’ satisfaction and growing 
market requirements. 
 
The concern of this article is to explain and understand the problems of effective 
state ownership administration in Russia, to develop a methodological base to assess 
it, and to suggest directions for the improvement of the management system. The 
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key points of the research are reflected in the following sections: literature review 
and methodology, results, and discussion. 
 
The first section of the article reviews the theoretical basis concerning the influence 
of property rights protection on economic development. The author offers a system 
of indicators to measure the effectiveness of state ownership administration. The 
second part describes the purposes and the problems of modern state policy in the 
field of property administration; in particular, new instruments of administration are 
discussed. Also in this section author proposes ways to increase the effectiveness of 
state ownership administration. The author is sure that transformations in the system 
of state ownership management have to improve the structure as a whole; they must 
include both legislative regulations and improvement of the management process. 
Responsibility and motivation problems of the civil service management system, 
which are one of the ways to improve the management process, are discussed in the 
second part. Only then, in the third section, the author offers the directions for the 
improvement of the civil service management system. 
 
2.  Literature Review and Methodology 
 
The possibility of a high-quality transformation in the state ownership institute is a 
factor of economic development. This is the subject of scientific research in foreign 
and domestic schools of sciences: institutional economics, public choice theory, and 
the theory of “collective action”. These theoretical researches form the 
methodological basis of the paper. 
 
Modern economics theory does not doubt the importance of institutes for the 
economic growth. Moreover, the interrelation between the quality of the institutional 
environment and the rates of the economic growth is confirmed in numerous 
researches (Clague et al., 1997; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004; Cox, 2008; 
Pargendler, 2012; Marra & Carlei, 2014). Scientists, as a rule, take a start from 
economic-mathematical models that allow tracking the influence of institutional 
factors on the rates of economic growth. Thus, there are a number of methodological 
problems, including the problem of quantitative and qualitative assessment of 
institute functioning. 
 
Qualitative assessment of the institutional environment is usually based on expert 
polls. Rating comparison of the received estimates allows comparing the indicators 
of various countries, but it does not reflect the essence of macroeconomic 
interrelations. Besides, estimation results depend on the tracking points of a so-
called ideal position in a model and can change according to the conditions of social 
development. 
 
The indicator of the level of property rights protection (the International Property 
Right Index, IPRI) is most often used in empirical researches of the authors whose 
works are devoted to the influence of property rights on the economic growth 
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(Shleifer, Glaeser, La Porta, & Lopezde-Silanes, 2004; Easterly, Ritzan, & Woolcock, 
2006; Bogetti & Obermann, 2008). However, “the protected property rights” is a 
qualitative and multidimensional concept, so it is difficult to be qualitatively indicated. 
The “objective” quantitative index of property rights protection within a country 
characterizes the situation partially as it reflects only one of the numerous aspects 
(Freynkman, Dashkeev & Muftiahetdinova, 2009). The method of expert evaluations 
is also imperfect. The reason of it consists in the absence of data in long time intervals 
in some countries (Drakić, 2007). 
 
The listed methodological difficulties are expressed in the lack of a common 
objective indicator and its replacement by various indicators of the institute quality 
or the quality (stability) of the institutional environment. 
 
Another point to consider is that there is no consensus in the scientific community 
concerning the indicators that most adequately reflect the quality of a country’s 
institutional environment. Usually scientists study the influence of the system of 
institutional factors on economy functioning. Thus, an institutional factor can be 
understood as a special social system influencing the formation process of the 
institutional environment including both formal and informal behavior rules in a 
particular situation. In a broad sense, institutional factors are considered as a set of 
mechanisms and rules that provide redistribution of resources in economy, attraction 
of new investments and training of manpower, and also form the system of 
incentives for efficiency increase (Radygin & Entov, 2008). 
 
The quality of the legal system, the extent of the financial system development, the 
protection of property rights, the development of basic legal institutes, the freedom 
of the press, political freedom, and the quality of anti-corruption control are among 
the institutional factors that have impact on the economic growth. Close interaction 
of all above-mentioned factors creates additional methodological difficulties in the 
analysis of their influence on the economic growth. Every attempt to estimate the 
value of a particular factor will be connected with the difficulty of differentiation 
concerning the influence of each factor. 
 
Authors give various institute classifications, conditionally grouping them in 
accordance with the sphere of influence on the national economic system. Thus, it is 
possible to estimate the quality of the institutional environment on the basis of the 
indicators characterizing four institute groups: (1) legal institutes; (2) regulating 
institutes; (3) institutes of human capital development; (4) institutes of risks 
coordination and distribution (Freynkman et al., 2009, p.36-40). 
 
These groups of indicators form a general criterion, which assesses quality of 
institutional transformations in the property relations system. In the practice of 
economic activities this criterion is often expressed by an indicator of effective state 
ownership management. Effective state ownership management demands qualitative 
legal decisions in the sphere of property relations. It reflects the extent of realization 
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of administrative and social functions in a state. Effective functioning of state 
ownership provides risks coordination and distribution in the public sector.  
 
More than that, the formation of universal institutional “growth recipes” (for 
example, the list of priority institutional tools for modernization) is extremely 
difficult, despite the progress in the research of the economic growth and the 
achieved consensus on the defining role of institutes. 
 
So, D. Acemoglu highlights the complexity of institutional transformations and, 
developing R. Coase’s views, pays attention to the difficulties of reforming the 
distributive relations (Acemoglu, 2003, p.86). In particular, he points out active 
counteraction of the officials interested in “status quo” maintenance to keep 
inefficient institutes (from business and population point of view) in order to have 
the opportunity to political rent seeking. Therefore, if corruption is widespread in a 
society, it is more difficult to reform legal and economic institutes of long-term 
development, including public and private property. 
 
Universal recipes for the acceleration of institutional reforms concerning property 
relations can probably be offered not soon, and many documents will always 
demand careful amendments that will take into account the uniqueness of local 
conditions. Moreover, some procedures of institutional reforms, especially those of 
political and economic aspects, mean better understanding of general institutional 
dynamics. At the same time general conclusions about the strategy of high-quality 
institutional transformations, offered by Rodrik et al., deserve attention. They are: 
 A universal comprehensive reform of institutes is not necessary in most 
cases. The strategy of reforms has to be concentrated on a limited set of key 
institutional restrictions. 
 Same objectives can be achieved by means of various institutional 
decisions. Import of institutes should be balanced with their careful adaptation to 
local conditions. 
 Reformers have to be ready to institutional changes (experiments) in 
accordance with initial conditions and local traditions. They have to be ready to 
change the policy on the basis of careful monitoring and assessment of actual results 
of the carried-out reforms.  
 It is necessary to pay attention to strengthening of the institutes that 
provide stability of economy to external shocks, such as the system of social 
protection and consultative mechanisms between the government and main social 
groups (Rodrik et al., 2004, p.142). 
 
Applying these recommendations to Russian economy, we can estimate the 
importance of high-quality institutional transformations in the system of property 
relations and realize the potential of innovative economy development, which is 
involved in state ownership.  
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State ownership is a basic institute of the economic system, by means of which a 
state realizes socio-economic purposes of a society development. This institute can 
adapt for regional conditions and at the same time guarantee the existence of 
common strategic objectives of a state. Strengthening of the state ownership institute 
provides economy stability, social safety, direct connections between authorities and 
the private sector of the economy. 
 
Transition to innovative economy is impossible if a state does not participate in this 
process as an organizer and as an active agent of its realization. In modern 
conditions, the need for the use of backbone qualities and reserves of the state 
ownership system is observed. System reserves of state ownership can be estimated 
as the extent of the influence of property rights protection on the major factors of 
economic growth that stimulate innovative activity (investments, scientific and 
human capital development). 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 State policy in the field of property administration 
The issues of effective use of state ownership and socio-economic efficiency of the 
public sector in Russia are interesting from the practical point of view. The public 
sector is still large in Russia. According to publications of Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it makes about 50% of GDP. In 
the period of 2012-2013, the number of state ownership enterprises (SOEs) reached 
2 356 in comparison with 326 in Poland, 57 in France, 47 in Canada, and 19 in the 
USA. Their quantity decreased a little and was 2 008 in the year of 2014. Russia 
takes one of the leading positions in the number of employees in SOEs: 636 115 
people without public servants (i.e., Tab. 1). Among the recommendations of OECD 
concerning modernization of Russian economy is the need to reduce the size of the 
public sector, to improve state administration and to develop corporate management. 
 
Table 1. Overview of SOEs by countries, 2012-2013 
 
 Indicators 
Country  Number of 
enterprises  
Number 
of employees  
Russia 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
2 356 
326 
125 
636 115 
159 730 
140 300 
China 117 n/a 
Portugal 89 171 534 
Germany 72 349 203 
France 57 1 584 501 
Spain 53 95 589 
Turkey 50 246 071 
Sweden 49 135 608 
Canada 47 86 558 
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Norway 45 221 045 
United States 19 599 010 
United Kingdom 17 332 601 
Denmark 17 22 823 
Australia 15 49 945 
Source: State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council the People’s Republic of China. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/; Federal Agency for State 
Property Management (Rosimushchestvo), Report 2012/2013, Report 2014 
http://rosim.ru/about/reports/performance/38326;The Size and Sectoral Distribution of SOEs 
in OECD and Partner Countries. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/the-
size-and-sectoral-distribution-of-soes-in-oecd-and-partner-countries_9789264215610-en. 
DOI: 10.1787/9789264215610-en 
 
Until recently state ownership privatization has been considered by authorities as the 
main source of budget revenues and the main tool for attraction of private 
investments into economy. The indicators of privatization revenues in Russia for the 
last 7 years are presented in Table 2. According to it, the size of privatization 
revenues decreases after reduction of the number of SOEs. 
  
Table 2. Indicators of privatization revenues in Russia, 2008-2014 
 
 Years 
Indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Size of privatization revenues, 
bln. dollars. 
41.86 46.12 51.57 58.88 64.70 57.03 18.72 
Share of privatization revenues 
in GDP, % 
3.6 3.6 3.4 3.04 3.2 4.3 2.4 
Share of state ownership 
enterprises and organizations 
in total of the registered 
organizations, % 
7.9 7.6 7.1 6.4 5.9 n/a n/a 
Source: Statistical reports of Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation 
http://www.gks.ru/ 
 
Despite quite a large number of privatization deals in the period of 2013-2014, their 
value is small in comparison with the European countries, Canada, the USA, and 
China (i.e., Tab. 3). This fact testifies inefficiency of the privatization methods used 
in Russia and indicates the need for the improvement of state ownership 
management. 
 
Table 3. Ranking countries by total privatization revenues, 2013-2014 
 
Country Deals Value (mln. dollars) 
2013 2014 2013 2014 
Russia 26 17 10 543 6 474 
Poland 13 7 3 648 1 097 
Portugal 6 3 5 445 2 075 
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France 10 13 5 664 5 729 
Spain 11 5 3 861 7 189 
Greece 4 4 11 190 11 482 
Turkey 4 4 12 400 10 000 
Sweden 9  7 840 n/a  
Canada n/a 8 n/a  1 459 
United States 10 6 6 415 7 478 
United Kingdom 11 12 16 277 11 650 
Denmark 2 1 2 008 2 007 
Australia 9  9 731 n/a 
China 115 124 41 308 40 640 
South Korea 14 7 2 748 2 004 
Source: State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/ ; Privatization Barometer, Report 2013/2014. http// 
www.privatizationbarometer.net; Government at a Glance. http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2013_gov_glance-2013-en 
DOI:10.1787/gov_glance-2013-en 
 
Nowadays, according to federal authorities, one of the priority directions for the 
improvement of the system of state ownership management is realization of the 
actions aimed at qualitative improvement of administrative activities. In this regard, in 
the state program of the Russian Federation “Federal property management” 
(approved as the Resolution of Government  No 327 of April 15, 2014) new objectives 
of state ownership management are defined: (1) to form target functions of each 
property asset that is in state ownership, taking into account preferences of main 
consumer groups; (2) to develop “road maps” for the realization of strategic objectives 
of property objects use; (3) to create management mechanisms for property complex 
development, including macroeconomic factors; (4) to create the risk control system; 
(5) to provide the accounting and monitoring of the efficient use of state ownership 
objects, etc. 
 
Introduction of these tools into management practice is urged to provide one of the 
main public administration functions – the assessment of efficient use of economic 
resources, in this case – federal property. The assessment of efficient use of state 
ownership completes a number of important tasks. Firstly, efficiency measurement 
allows to analyze the productivity of the applied management methods and to reveal 
their shortcomings. Secondly, it defines possible directions for the efficiency increase 
in property complex use. Thirdly, it can calculate target indicators of property 
functioning, taking into account the problems of innovative development in Russia.  
 
Regularly carried out monitoring of efficient use of state ownership contributes to 
the formation of the information base that is necessary for the assessment of 
authorities’ activities in the sphere of state ownership management. Therefore, 
providing the accounting and monitoring of state ownership is one of the key 
purposes of the subprogram “Increase of effective management of federal property 
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and privatizations” (the state program of the Russian Federation “Federal property 
management” [Rosimushchestvo], 2015). 
 
According to the program, the Federal Agency for State Property Management 
(Rosimushchestvo) is obliged to develop a common system of accounting and 
monitoring of the efficiency of federal property management in the short term (2015-
2018). Therefore, by 2015 it is planned to introduce a federal property management 
system and to create new methodology for federal property accounting. By 2018 the 
Agency should put the technique of comparative analysis of federal property efficiency 
into practice and develop an automatic system for statistical monitoring of changes in the 
federal property structure and dynamics of economic indicators of the activities in SOEs.  
 
The main expected result of the implementation of the subprogram is the formation 
of conditions for the transition to socially oriented innovative development of 
domestic economy. 
 
Thus, the concept of federal property management and the state program “Federal 
property management” become a long-awaited step towards high-quality 
transformations of the state ownership institute in Russia. However, not everything is 
as simple as it seems at first sight. The use of new instruments in public administration 
will not immediately solve numerous problems in the system of state ownership 
management in Russia. Property relations affect legal and social aspects of public 
development; they are the basis of any economic system. It means that transformations 
in the system of state ownership management have a systematic character and include 
both actions directed on qualitative improvement of legislative regulation and 
improvement of the management process. Only systematic transformations in the 
sphere of state ownership management can increase efficiency of state ownership in 
Russia. 
 
3.2 Ways to increase the effectiveness of state ownership administration 
The need for qualitative improvement of legislative regulation in the sphere of 
property relations is defined by the existence of numerous legal gaps, which both 
preserve excessive and unregulated property rights for authorities and disperse 
responsibility between various governmental management institutions. It 
complicates complete control of the process of state ownership use, blocks 
realization of its innovative potential and practically legalizes shadow privatization. 
 
Moreover, the long period of the current privatization process in addition to the 
absence of incentives to effective administrative activities among public servants 
have led to the existence of legal opportunities for state ownership repartition. This 
impedes realization of national interests and influences motivation of private owners 
to efficient activities, significantly reducing interest of the private sector in long-
term investments. 
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The underrun of legislation in the sphere of property relations regulation from 
domestic economy realities not only testifies low efficiency in the use of state 
ownership objects, but also points to inefficiency of the state ownership institute in 
the economic system. Thus, the longer inefficient behavior standards formed by the 
state exist, the more inefficient institutes of economy become, provoking the 
emergence of the institutional trap effect (QWERTY-effect). 
Within the state program “Federal property management”, the government of the 
Russian Federation has planned measures of legal regulation in the sphere of 
property relations for 2014-2018. Their timely performance is an indispensable 
condition for successful realization of the state policy concerning the improvement 
of state property management. 
 
Numerous actions of authorities directed on efficiency increase in the process of 
state ownership management also refer to high-quality transformations of the 
institutional environment. 
 
With regard to foreign practice of public administration, it is possible to formulate 
several ways for the improvement of the process of state ownership management: 
 improvement of the organization of the management process (on the basis 
of convergence of principles and mechanisms of public and private management);  
 improvement of management (with due regard to innovative approaches in 
public administration such as: introduction of the means that can provide 
management transparency, introduction of service standards, interaction with 
professional associations (see also Grover, 2009);  
 strengthening control of activities in enterprises and organizations (risk 
management and internal control); 
 increase of quality standards in corporate management (corporate 
management code);  
 improvement of the system of civil service management (the system of 
responsibility and motivation), etc. 
 
If the first three ways for the improvement of the process of state ownership 
management are widely presented in modern scientific literature and have already 
found practical application in activities of authorities, the last two have received 
reflection in normative legal acts rather recently. 
 
The need of corporate management improvement is widely discussed both at the 
level of the government of the Russian Federation and at the level of expert 
communities. As a result of discussions, the change of corporate practice in 
companies with state share (SOEs) was planned in accordance with the new version 
of the corporate management code (approved at the meeting of the government on 
February 13, 2014). For this purpose it is necessary to broaden the powers of boards 
of directors in the next two years, to introduce long-term development programs, to 
define and regularly estimate indicators of efficiency for SOEs and their top 
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management, and to change the system of state property management (see also 
Gusev, 2014). 
 
The absence of an effective corporate management model in state companies in 
practice is one of the barriers that impedes effective use of state ownership. In this 
regard a contradictory situation occurs: on the one hand, responsibility for inefficient 
administrative decisions concentrates on boards of directors, on the other hand, their 
dependence on relevant administrative departments’ increases. Thus, in the period of 
2011-2014 activities of boards of directors gain more and more formal character 
while independent directors, who are compelled to agree on any strategic 
development plan of a company with branch ministries, gradually lose freedom of 
decision-making (Rosimushchestvo, 2015). 
 
The comparative analysis of the countries concerning the indicators of motivational 
programs in SOEs shows that the level of director’s reward differs in Russia (i.e., Tab. 
4). Nearly one quarter of all board members are foreigners (24%), which is much 
higher than in Italy (7%) and Spain (11%), but lower than in France or the United 
Kingdom (31% and 33% respectively). The largest number of foreign directors is 
observed in the Netherlands (43%) and Switzerland (59%). The reason is that these 
countries host headquarters of the largest international companies. Less than half of 
the companies in Russia (39%) have at least one woman as a part of board of 
directors. It is an exclusively low indicator in comparison with France (100%), Italy 
(87%) or Spain (68%). Board meetings in absentia are widely applied for vote in 
Russia. Such method of decision-making explains essential differences in the 
number of board meetings in Russia and other European countries: on average 22,3 
meetings a year are held in Russia and twice less than that - in Italy (10,5). If to take 
only meetings in an internal form, the average value in Russia falls to 7,4 a year, 
which is comparable with a similar indicator in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, France and Switzerland. 
 
Table 4. Ranking countries by indicators of motivational programs in SOEs, 2014 
 
Indicators     Country      
Tur
key 
Fra
nce  
Italy  Spai
n  
Switzerla
nd 
Germ
any  
UK Nether
lands 
Russ
ia 
US
A 
Average 
board size 
9.6 14 12.2 11.4 10.6 14 10.5 9.5 10.6 10.
8 
Percentage of 
companies 
with at least 
one woman 
on the board 
8.7 62 50 13 16 43 60 62 39 84 
Percentage of 
foreign board 
members  
15 31 7 11 59 n/a 33 43 24 8 
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Board 
meeting/year 
(average) 
17.
5 
8.3 10.5 10.4 8.3 6,1 7.6 8,6 22.3 8.1 
Average size 
of a director 
reward, mln. 
dollars   
44.
5 
50.
6 
75.0 70.9 186.0 73, 0 97.0 92.6 101.
0 
94.
0 
Source: Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2014 (2015). Retrieved from: 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/spencer-stuart-us-board-index-2014 
 
Only 170 of 436 directors (39%) of the leading Russian companies are considered 
independent by the companies. On average, 3,6 independent directors are the share of 
one board of directors. Among other European countries, which entered the analysis of 
this indicator in Russia, only Spain (38%) and Turkey (34%) concede (Spencer Stuart 
Board Index, 2014). So activity and the level of responsibility of directors in Russian 
companies is higher, and the standard level of remuneration is lower. In general, 
remuneration averages 101 million dollars, but it is extremely differentiated and can 
change from 18 to 350 million dollars. 
 
Lack of regular monitoring significantly complicates the analysis and does not allow 
making adequate conclusions. Programs of long-term motivation for public servants 
are absent at all. The situation that has developed in the sphere of corporate 
management becomes aggravated due to incapacity of the existing system of 
responsibility and motivation in civil service management to perform efficiently in 
the system of federal property management. 
 
3.3 Responsibility and motivation issues in the system of civil service management 
The system of responsibility and motivation plays a special role in state ownership 
management. It is capable of having impact on the management process not only 
from within the system, imposing responsibility for poor management on public 
servants and motivating them to effective activities, but also going beyond its 
frames, expanding to the corporate sector and private investors, motivating and 
demotivating them to economic activity. 
 
The main reason for the incapacity of the existing system of civil service 
management is that new tasks of state ownership management are not provided with 
appropriate resources. Moreover, supply of resources does not correspond to the 
extent of responsibility distribution between officials. Requirements, which are 
imposed on public servants, do not cover needs for high-quality execution of an 
owner’s functions. Besides, formal official criteria contradict the volume and degree 
of responsibility at the solved tasks (Gusev, 2014). 
 
The representatives of the consulting council at the Federal Agency for State 
Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) note that at the moment there are no 
allocated zones of responsibility for the privatization process among supervising 
executive authorities. In the period of 2013-2014 the number of directives has 
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doubled while only 2% of employees provide 98% of the agency income and 10% of 
employees control 90% of risks. New competences necessary for solution of new 
tasks are not supported with the available resources, but are mainly based on 
enthusiasm of public servants. 
 
The developed motivation system for public servants does not work in fact. 
Common motivation for all employees, which does not take account of individual 
contributions to results and risks decrease, only creates conditions for demotivation. 
For example, a high-quality sale of an asset demands many efforts on coordination 
and advancement of privatization processes, at the same time, there is no punishment 
for violation of privatization terms (there is no common linking body between those 
who make decisions and those who advance them at the level of federal authorities). 
This results in indifference to the growth of the sale price (the excess of the sale 
price over the planned one is not considered in any way in the motivation system) 
and emergence of additional functions irrelevant to staff number and available 
competences. 
 
The majority of the existing problems in the system of civil service management have 
a number of intersystem reasons independent on the current authorities’ purposes. 
They are: (1) lack of due cognitive (the highest) level of human resource management: 
absence of meanings, archetypes, systems of values, ethics and ideology which 
(besides the opportunity to trade on the official position) could present public service 
as attractive; (2) lack of due information management: management of information 
channels when selecting highly professional employees. 
 
In general the low level of management is caused by the following factors: (1) fixed 
low levels of payment; (2) lack of an additional monetary system and non monetary 
motivation for achievements; (3) a considerable level of corruption in undocumented 
and non-transparent administrative processes; (4) blurring of an individual’s 
responsibility for the made decisions; (5) lack of transparency in control of midline 
and final results. 
 
Active introduction of the mechanisms of management by results into activities of 
authorities, formed in accordance with the concepts of New Public Administration 
(NPM) and Good Governance, has ambiguous impact on the system of civil service 
management. 
 
In the frames of these concepts two principles form a basis for the increase of 
efficiency in administrative influence: creation of accurate standards and indicators 
of productivity and transfer of attention focus from processes directly to 
management results. This increases personal responsibility of managing directors, 
prevents small corruption, and motivates public servants to have an active position 
in the management process.
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Nevertheless, the analysis of Russian practice in use of management by results testifies 
that productivity indicators are generally used as the instrument of control (reporting), 
but not management. Thus, administrative benefits from productivity indicators use 
are perceived by public servants as insignificant (Kalgin, 2012, p.46). 
 
In accordance with the received results some specific problems, which not only 
negatively influence efficiency of administrative activities, but also contradict the 
methodological basis of management by results, have been revealed: (1) inability of 
some government departments to influence the identified indicator; (2) lack of 
interdepartmental coordination and cooperation; (3) lack of feedback after approval 
of indicators. 
 
If public servants do not understand how and what for these or those indicators of 
productivity are established, they treat their performance formally. In Russian practice it 
is accepted that responsibility for each indicator has to be consolidated to this or that 
division. Thus, the question of the one who plays the leading role in work does not rise 
(federal authorities are meant). However, essential differences consist in that one 
department bears responsibility for the “imputed” indicator, while another initiates the 
development of the indicator and plays the leading role in its monitoring. 
 
These weaknesses limit the potential of productivity indicators as an instrument for 
motivation of public servants, and open new opportunities for evasion from 
responsibility for people and departmental organizations in charge. 
 
So, collaboration of departments in order to improve an indicator (or groups of 
indicators) can be considered as a problem of collective action. Expenses are incurred by 
a particular department but benefits are distributed between all. Therefore, the problem 
of a “free rider” occurs. Famous economist and sociologist M. Olson claims that 
collective action will not take place unless its participants have their personal interest in 
the success of a deal. In other words, simple consciousness of that your actions help 
“common cause” are insufficient to motivate a rational participant of a group. In this 
case, address benefits or enforcement is necessary (Olson, 1982, p.82).  
 
In conclusion, it is possible to point out a positive moment that is the existence of 
opportunity to identify problems on the basis of interregional comparison, and to 
signal companion problems and needs for financing (budgeting). 
 
4. Discussion  
 
4.1 Directions of improvement in the system of civil service management  
If to remember that employees in fact solve everything, it is reasonable to define 
three priorities in improvement of state ownership management in Russia: 
1) To master new administrative technologies – to learn how to operate 
effectively not only on a physical (direct, manual) level of management, but also on 
informational and cognitive levels.  
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2) It is essential to increase the critically low level of professional skills 
among management authorities and public servants. A special attention should be 
paid to development of professional skills in risks and opportunities management, 
which is becoming extremely urgent in the present period of global economic 
recession, growth of risks, uncertainty and changes. 
3) To provide development of key nonfunctional “soft skills” of management 
among directors, which, as practice shows, are almost completely absent among the 
overwhelming majority of state property managers. According to the tendencies of 
educational programs modernization in western universities and business schools, as 
well as results of the analysis of the demand for employees in effective international 
corporations, “soft skills” of management come out on top of required professional 
skills (Gusev, 2014).   
 
Management based on “soft skills” includes critical thinking, adaptability, emotional 
intelligence, ability to solve problems, management of stresses, psychology of 
influence and reflexive communications. The problem of competitiveness in modern 
economic and social environment cannot be solved without “soft skills” of 
management. 
 
Thus, actions for improvement of the responsibility and motivation system among 
management authorities and public servants can be perceived as a factor for 
successful realization of modern purposes of state ownership management. It is 
possible to outline the following perspective directions: 
 optimization of the management process: creation of a functional 
interaction model, identification of criteria and indicators for effective administrative 
activities in the system, development of procedure to monitor efficiency of 
administrative influence;  
 professional development of public servants: overcoming  the role model 
“the registrar – the manager”, creation and implementation of development 
programs; 
 introduction of the complex motivation system: labor productivity 
increase, increase of the motivation level among personnel, change of qualification 
requirements to employees; 
 development of corporate culture: fight against corruption at all levels, 
formation of collegial bodies, introduction of the mechanism of internal control into 
main processes; 
 development of the system of relationships between authorities and expert 
communities concerning state property management in the medium-term and long-
term period. 
 
When realizing these directions it is important to keep balance between controlling 
and administrative actions. Introduction of the practice of assessment concerning 
efficiency of public servants activities, as well as monitoring and expansion of control 
N.G. Filatova 
 
185 
forms in state ownership management go along with the increased requirements to 
government reporting.  
 
In addition, the responsibility of government representatives increases, and the basis 
for administrative and disciplinary responsibility extends. It discourages activities of 
public servants even more, having an adverse effect on qualitative institutional 
transformations in the system of state ownership management. To realize innovative 
potential of state ownership it is necessary to develop and introduce a package of 
measures for the improvement of the system of civil service management. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The privatization process in transition economies is the basis for economic reforms 
in other areas. Various countries use various privatization methods and technologies 
as privatization processes have different purposes and tasks. Same methods yield 
different results: in some countries the results are excellent, in others – poor. Private 
property cannot separately lead to increased efficiency of the privatized companies 
in an inappropriate economic situation. It is necessary to improve the institutional 
environment, which is defined by property relations and includes the system of 
effective state ownership management.  
 
Qualitative improvement of public administration is the main direction in the state 
policy concerning implementation of state ownership administration in Russia. 
However, active introduction of the results-based management into activities of 
authorities does not provide the expected results. Existence and distribution of 
similar negative factors in the system of state ownership management over a long 
period (in fact from the beginning of common privatization and to the present stage 
of state ownership privatization) have led to creation of a favorable environment for 
different office abuses. Today, corruption scandals in the system of state ownership 
management are not surprising. Numerous examples of corruptive behavior among 
officials in the system of state ownership management and regular nature of judicial 
proceedings (both at federal and regional levels) have become a peculiar feature of 
public administration in Russia. The actions realized by the government within the 
program for counteraction of corruption remain ineffective and do not solve the 
corruption problem completely. 
 
From the author’s point of view, the main reasons of inefficiency in state ownership 
administration are based on incapacity of the system of civil service management. 
The system of civil service management has a special value in state ownership 
management because it has motivating and demotivating impact on the 
administrative process. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an effective monitoring 
and evaluation system of state ownership administration in order to promote 
remedial action for the weak elements of the system. The author offers concrete 
steps for the development of the system of civil service management: optimization 
of the management process, professional development of public servants, 
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development of a complex motivation system, fight against corruption, and 
involvement of expert communities. 
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